




The narrow measure of the money supply, M1,
consisting of coin and currency in the public's
hands and deposits with unlimited checking
privileges, grew rapidly in 1985. By june, M1
had greatly exceeded the 4-7 percent 1985 tar-
get range set in February, having grown at an 11
percent annual rate to that point. In july, the
Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Commit-
tee, or FOMC, announced a new target range of
3-8 percent growth for the second halfof 1985
and a new base - the actual level of M1 in the
second quartet - from which to calculate
growth. Since second quarter M1 was well
above the original target range, the decision to
use actual M1 as the new base in essence
impounded the overshoot into the level ofM1.
As shown in Chart 1, the practice of using the
actual level of M1 as the base from which new
target ranges are calcuated shifts the level of the
target path. For example, if M1 had grown at 51 12
percent (the midpoint ofthe 3-8 percent range)
after july, it would have remained permanently
above the path implied by a 51 12 percent growth
rate starting from the base at the fourth quarter
of 1984.
In this Letter, the factors that determine the
appropriate adjustment in the base from which
to calculate target ranges are discussed. It is
argued that eliminating all base adjustments is
likely to lead to inappropriate monetary policy,
and that, even if M1 always grew at the midpoint
of its target range, adjustments in the target base
would often be necessary.
Definition and criticism
The difference between the base used to calcu-
late a new monetary target range and the value
of the monetary aggregate M1 implied by the
midpoint of the old target is commonly called
"base drift." Ifthe midpoint were always used as
the new base no matter what actual M1 turned
out to be, no base drift would occur. In the past,
however, the FOMC has used the actual level of
M1 as its base - a procedure that results in
complete base drift. From 1975 through 1978,
the FOMC rebased its target ranges every quarter
using actual M1. Since 1979, rebasing has
occurred only at the start of each year with two
exceptions: in both 1983 and 1985 the target
ranges for M1 were rebased in july.
Monetarists have long criticized the FOMC for
allowing base drift to occur. Milton Friedman
has likened the Fed's practice to that of a marks-
man who always hits the bulls-eye by painting
the target after taking his shot (Wall Street Jour-
nal, August 20,1985). Base drift has been called
a major impediment to achieving price stability
since it essentially ratifies, and makes perma-
nent, deviations of money growth from target.
Federal Reserve officials have taken the view
that frequent shifts in the demand for money
often have required adjustments in the base of
target ranges. In this view, deviations from the
target growth path due to money demand shifts
in anyone year should be accommodated in
order to prevent monetary policy from automat-
ically becoming "too tight" or "too easy."
Ifdeviations from the midpoint ofthe Fed's M1
target growth path were small and as likely to be
positive as negative, average drift would be
close to zero even under a policy that allowed
complete base drift. However, as shown in Chart
2, base drift was positive in every year between
1976 and 1985 except two. Furthermore, it
ranged from negative $8.8 billion in 1981 to a
high of $20.9 billion in 1982.
The respective roles of base drift and the target
growth ranges can be seen in Chart 3. The solid
lines plot successive actual fourth quarter to
fourth quarter target ranges as established by the
FOMe. These target cones originate from the
actual level of M1 (M1-A prior to 1980) at the
start of each target period under the FOMC's
policy of allowing complete base drift. The
dashed set oftarget cones are drawn under a
hypothetical policy ofzero base drift- each
cone originates from the midpoint of the pre-
vious cone. As Chart 3 shows, the cumulative
effect of base drift accounts for a substantial part
ofthe total rise in M1 over the period plotted. InFRBSF
fact, base drift accounts for almost 25 percent of
the total increase in M1 since 1975.
Base drift and price stability
The effect of base drift on price stability can be
understood by using the simple quantity equa-
tion of exchange. In this equation, GNP, a mea-
sure oftotaUinaLspendingby households,
businesses and government, is equal to the vol-
ume of money available for spending (M) times
the average number oftimes in the period each
dollar is spent (its velocity, or V). At the same
time, GNP reflects the total volume of goods and
services purchased (Q) times its average price
(P). Thus, MV = PQ.
Since this "equation of exchange" holds by defi-
nition at each point in time, a change in M must
result in changes in V, P, or Q. Most economists
agree that the effect of an autonomous change in
the money supply (M) eventually falls almost
entirely on the price level (P). Hence, the prac-
ticeof complete base drift would appear even-
tually to lead to a parallel drift in the price level
if Vand Q are unaffected. If price stability is a
goal of monetary policy, it would seem that all
base drift should be eliminated.
This conclusion is valid, however, only if
velocity and real GNP are not subject to per-
sistent shifts. For example, suppose innovation
in the finan.cial market leads to a permanent
increase in velocity as individuals and busi-
nesses find they can manage the same volume of
transactions while holding, on average, smaller
M1 balances. This appears to have happened in
the mid-1970s as corporations developed more
efficient methods for managing their money bal-
ances. If, in these circumstances, the velocity of
money rises above trend and the growth path of
M1is kept fixed, either Por Q must also rise
above trend. A policy that aims for price and
outputstability should, in this case, reduce the
level of the growth path of M enough to coun-
teract the upward shift in velocity.
Similarly; a technological innovation that per-
manently affected the long-run, or full employ-
ment, path of real GNP \Yould lead to price level
adjustmentsifthe growth path of M remained
unchanged. Price stability will therefore require
that the base ofthe target range for M be
adjusted in response to'some output and
velocity movements. However, such adjust-
ments would not be appropriate in response to
all velocity and output disturbances. An impor-
tant distinction must be made between perma-
nent and temporary movements in output and
velocity.
Permanent and temporary disturbances
When output temporarily rises above trend dur-
ing the upswing of a business cycle, the appro-
priate monetary policy would be to avoid base
drift - that is, to prevent a rise in the growth
path of M. Such a policy would result in a rise in
interest rates which, in turn, would moderate
spending and help to stabilize real output. Tem-
porary fluctuations in real GNP should not be
completely accommodated by adjusting the
level of the money supply's growth path since
this would eventually affect prices. Similarly, if
M1 rose during the year in response to a tempo-
rary velocity decline, or iftechnical factors
prevented the Fed from controlling M1 exactly
and caused a target to be missed, any base drift
would be inappropriate.
There is an increasing body of empirical evi-
dence suggesting that disturbances to velocity
and real output on an annual basis are pre-
dominately permanent in nature. For example,
the work of Charles Nelson ofthe University of
Washington and Charles Plosser of the Univer-
sity of Rochester has shown that both real GNP
and velocity can be thought of as growing at an
average, or trend rate, while subject to unpredic-
table shifts up or down in their levels - shifts
that, in the absence of further shocks, are perma-
nent. Thus, ifM1 velocity rises 4 percent during
a year, rather than its average rate of 3 percent,
the extra 1 percent growth is likely to represent a
shift upward in its level that in itself is perma-
nent. Similar results have been found to apply to
deviations from the trend growth of real GNP.
This suggests that, more often than not, the mon-
etary target base should be adjusted to offset
velocity or output disturbance almost com-
pletely.
For example, in late 1982, velocity declined rel-
ative to its trend, and M1 was allowed to over-
shoot its target range. In setting the new base for
the 1983 target range, the FOMC explicitly
allowed base drift to occur by using the above-
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the decline in velocity appeared to be perma-
nent. The subsequent behavior ofthe economy,
which showed no acceleration of inflation, con-
firmed the appropriateness of base drift in this
case.
More recently, the rebasing of the M1 target
ranges in July 1985 followed the approximately
5 percent decline in M1 velocity during the first
six months of 1985. In its July meeting, the
FaMC reviewed whether the fall in velocity was
a one-time. shift or was likely to reverse itself. By
rebasing the target path, the FaMC chose a pol-
icy that was consistent with a belief that the
velocity decline was permanent. If M1 had not
been allowed to rise sufficiently in the face of a
permanent velocity decline, monetary policy
would have become overly tight, and the new
base for subsequent target ranges would need to
be above the actual value of M1 to offset the
lack of policy response.
Conclusion
Because the nature of velocity and output move-
ments can differ in different episodes, neither a
rule of zero drift nor one of complete drift will
always provide a superior guideline for policy.
However, because both velocity and output dis-
turbances tend to persist, price level stability will
generally require some year-to-year adjustment
in the base from which target ranges are calcu-
lated.
The policy records ofthe FaMC reveal that the
Committee has attempted to distinguish between
shifts in velocity that are viewed to be perma-
nent and those viewed as transitory. However,
by automatically using actual M1 as the base for
new target ranges, it is likely that some tempo-
rary disturbances have led to permanent
changes in the price level. The most appropriate
adjustment of the target base in any particular
period can only be determined by analyzing the
sources ofvelocity and output movements in
that period.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 202,908 676 14,913 7.9
Loans and Leases1 6 183,591 1,043 13,555 7.9
Commercial and Industrial 52,574 - 141 325 .6
Real estate 65,987 7 4,081 6.5
Loans to Individuals 38,618 - 95 6,260 19.3
Leases 5,694 151 428 8.1
U. S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,761 - 400 - 266 - 2.4
OtherSecurities2 8,555 31 1,623 23.4
Total Deposits 203,987 223 8,615 4.4
Demand Deposits 50,934 790 4,837 10.4
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 33,072 -1,177 4,178 14.4
OtherTransaction Balances4 15,239 - 249 2,173 16.6
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 137,813 - 319 1,604 1.1
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,013 - 33 3,062 7.1
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 38,134 - 143 - 1,900 - 4.7
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,086 1,403 5,486 26.6
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures














1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
s Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change